The paper deals with cooperative side payments game with restricted transferability (distributed utility consists of indivisible units). Corebased solutions and stable sets are considered. We review known results as well as prove new theorems concerning existence conditions and relations between solution concepts.
Introduction
Cooperative games arise in situations in which the participants can obtain additional utility (increase profit, power, prestige, influence, reduce costs) by pooling their resources, capitals, possibilities. The most simple and popular design of cooperative game (TU game) needs the assumptions of transferable utility and side payments. However, the distributed among players utility can consists of indivisible units. If the unit is one contract, project or one stock then the fractional values are not meaningful. This paper studies cooperative side payments game with integer outcomes and demonstrates the effect of integer requirements. Such games have been named in [4] the games with modified utility. J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern pointed out that thus a modification of utility concept "would make our theory more realistic", "but at the same time it is clear that definite difficulties must be overcome in order to carry out this program" [4] . Cooperative games with integer side payments were investigated in [1] , [3] , [6] , [7] and other works of the same authors. In [1] the definition "discrete game" is introduced.
Next section contains the standard facts of TU game theory. The properties of core-like solutions of discrete game are described in section 3. New sufficient condition for the core existence and criterion for the coincidence of core and D-core are presented. Section 4 is devoted to stable sets of discrete game. We formulate the necessary and sufficient condition for core stability as well as the sufficient condition for stability of D-core.
Preliminaries
A TU game G T = (N, ν) consists of players set N = {1, 2, ..., n} and set function ν :
where Z is the set of integer numbers. The sets
The stable set NM(G T ) of a game G T is defined by conditions
The family of all stable sets of a game
• C
and, moreover,
is the unique stable set.
• On the domain of convex game N M(G T ) = {C(G T )}.
Cores for discrete game
A discrete game G D differs from G T that ν is an integer-valued function and the outcomes are integers. Since G T can be rewritten as NTU game (N, V T ) with 
Notice that the intersection between D-core of TU game Ψ(G D ) and integer lattice cannot be equal to D-core of discrete game G D [6] . It follows straightforwardly from above definitions and the statements proved in [1] , [6] , [7] that for a game
• There exist discrete games such that
• There exist discrete games where
In [1] the set of all undominated imputations was called the core of discrete game. Theorem 3.3 (below) shows that, in fact, these sets coincide only on very special subclass of G
Proof. If y S x then y(S) ≤ ν(S) and y
and |α| denotes the absolute value of number α. By lemma 3.1,
Obviously, 
For any integer TU game the nonempty sets I(G T ) and I * (G T ) are integer polytops. The cores of permutationally convex (in particular, convex) games, big boss games, games satisfy the CoMa-property, T -simplex (∅ = S ⊆ N) and dual simplex games contain a marginal vector ore an extreme point of imputation set ore dual imputation set. Therefore, the characterizations of such games give sufficient conditions for the nonemptiness of core of discrete game. Allow us to present the extended condition.
Proof. It was proved in [5] that the payoff vector
belongs to the core of TU game (N,v) satisfying (5). Thus
Stable sets for discrete game
The stable set NM(G D ) for discrete game G D is defined by conditions
From properties of TU game stable sets and the statements proved in [7] follows that for a game
• There exist games determined by convex function ν where
•
The next theorem extends the result that each TU convex game has a unique stable set coinciding with D-core.
Proof. Under made assumption C(G
Evidently the theorem holds for a two-person game. Assume that n ≥ 3. Then Ω = ∅. Since DC(G D ) satisfies the internal stability we need only to show that
where Δ S is the fractional part of
ν(S)−y(S) |S|
. Define
From y ∈ I(G D ), (6) and (7) follow 2 ≤ |H| ≤ n − 1. Since a convex TU game is exact then there is
We have
The last statement in listed at the beginning of this section completes the proof.
The last theorem states that (contrary to TU game) the core of discrete game is stable iff it coincides with imputation set. 
Concluding remarks
We have seen that the properties of core, dual core, core cover of discrete game and relations between them are closely related to ones for TU game. The allocations belonging to these sets (and also D-core) can be computed with combinatorial algorithms. However, the solution concepts defined by means of domination relation do not show a similar behavior. For instance, it is very difficult working with TU game stable sets, but all stable sets of discrete game can be found with the graph theory algorithms, because any kernel of dominance graph corresponds to NM(G D ). The existence conditions for a kernel of directed graph give ones for stable set of discrete game.
